An unpublished comment on Serbia-Kosovo relations
They asked, I answered, they didn't use it. That's fine, up to them, but here it is.
[[[In the spirit of openness, when I have a full written statement that I have given (especially if the media outlet has used only a part of it), or if I have something that I wrote in language but was published in another, I’m putting those things up here.
This one is a statement made in response to a media request that the media outlet decided not to use. This is not a problem, they have their editors and they can decide what to use or not. For the record, it is an outlet closely tied to the Serbian regime (but oh, back in the day it was a fine Yugoslav news agency) of the type to which I usually decline to give statements. My principle exists, but it is loose: if a media outlet has directly participated in the promotion of hatred of violence, I won’t respond to their requests. If they are simply not independent, I take my chances.
In this case the regime-associated agency wanted assessments of the present situation in Kosovo. They asked a bunch of people and ran those responses. I have complete understanding for media of this type that do not run my statements, I am problematic and scary, and I am also old and stubborn so just try to change me.
In any case, for your enjoyment, here it is.]]]
Hello, thanks for your message. Let me try to answer the questions that you have asked.
The first question asks for my assessment of the situation in Kosovo in general. Let me come back to this one and answer it last, since my answers to the other questions will be very brief.
The second question asks about the dialogue between Serbia and Kosovo and whether it is likely to regain life in the near future, possibly by the end of the year. Here I think that very little is likely to happen for two reasons. The first reason is that with elections coming in December, Mr Vučić has very little motivation to do anything but keep tensions escalated. This is because he is aware that support for his regime depends on maintaining a sense of fear and insecurity among citizens. Whether the current level of fear and insecurity provoked by the attack on police and on the monastery in Kosovo by the organised crime forces that the regime sponsors was created intentionally or not, it serves his purpose in the short term to maintain it and he will. So there is very little prospect of movement toward anything like a resolution by the end of December, or similarly in the near future.
The third question asks for my view on the fact that Kosovo is reinforcing and strengthening its military force. This development is entirely predictable. When one party in a conflict escalates, the most probable consequence is that the other party will escalate as well. There are no surprises here.
The fourth question asks for an assessment of the visit of Mr Stoltenberg, the general secretary of NATO, to the region. These sorts of visits are always either for the purpose of advancing a negotiation or of expressing concern, always with the additional purpose of gathering information and generating assessments. This would appear to be the case in this instance too. In particular, Mr Stoltenberg wants to show that NATO is paying attention to events in Kosovo.
Now let's return to the first question, about the overall situation in Kosovo. For many years, both the actors involved and many of the internationals have been satisfied with the condition of what is called a “frozen conflict.” Some regional politicians, Mr Vučić and Mr Dačić in particular, have even spoken affirmatively of “frozen conflicts.” It is obvious enough why frozen conflict can be beneficial to parties involved in the conflict. An ongoing condition of lawlessness allows for long term operation of grey markets and informal channels of influence, while lack of resolution provides a nearly inexhaustible resource to be exploited by propaganda that will encourage people to fear that they will lose rights and privileges that they now enjoy, or that they will become victims of violence again.
It is not so clear that “frozen conflicts” bring so many benefits to citizens, many of whom are looking for justice and all of whom are looking for resolutions to their problems.
The current catastrophic situation in Gaza illustrates the danger of maintaining an extended “frozen conflict.” This is a case in which the Israeli government, rather than building a partnership with an actor that was willing to find a resolution, sponsored a rivalry instead with an actor that was interested in permanent conflict, thinking that a permanent enemy could be transformed into a client, and that the ongoing tensions would create a semi permanent feeling of insecurity that could be exploited by politicians in power. At the same time there was an effort to generate regional solutions through mediators, in a process that would allow Israel to avoid dialogue or negotiation with its Palestinian opponents. It is obvious in retrospect that the situation this created was unsustainable, and that it would lead excluded parties to assert their importance by committing a major act of violence - which led to an even larger act of retaliation.
It is not clear whether the political leadership in Serbia and in Kosovo are aware that their sustained lack of progress in negotiation is creating a similar danger for them. It is entirely unclear whether the European and other negotiators are conscious of the inadequacy of their engagement so far, and of the necessity for progress. But it is possible to say this. The concerns of the ethnic Serb citizens of Kosovo about loss of social benefits and of social recognition, and about domination in a majority ruled state, are real. A series of Serbian governments has done a lot to encourage this feeling of insecurity and has done very little to address the material concerns behind it. Similarly, the concerns of ethnic Albanian citizens of Kosovo becoming victims of violence are real. These concerns have also been encouraged rather than addressed. The majority of the ethnic Albanian population of Kosovo has a vision about what they would like their situation to be in the future. They would like to be citizens of a state whose independence is recognised and that holds a place in the international community. The same cannot be said for the majority of the ethnic Serb population of Kosovo, which has been encouraged to reject the state where they live and to pursue confrontation rather than resolution. The tension we see now will be ongoing, and we will see interludes without violence rather than peace, unless the communities and their representatives generate an idea about what mutual understanding and coexistence - a resolution - would entail. This is a job that would be better and more thoroughly and thoughtfully carried out by people in the communities involved rather than by international mediators who will attempt to impose ready made, formulaic, and unsuitable schemes. It would be good if the local governments would encourage this work to be done, rather than trying to prevent it as they have been so far.