Full texts for this week

A comment on the manufacture of tensions in Mitrovica, why Dodik is canoodling with Orbán, and an interview on a bunch of topics

Photo: Kosovo Online

In keeping with my usual practice of providing full English language text for statements I have offered in media that are either run in another language or as not the full text, here is the statement I gave to Gazeta Blic (Kosovo) on the initiative to open the New Bridge in Mitrovica to automotive traffic. The statement as it was run (in Albanian) can be found here.

What I sent to them (in English):

It is probably worth pointing out that not very much about transportation or communication depends on the question of whether the bridge is reopened. People and goods can move between both parts of the city now, and they will continue to be able to move whether the bridge is reopened or not. There are three other bridges in the city that are open, and even the bridge in question is open to pedestrian traffic. It is basically a question of political power.

For Kurti and for the municipal governments in the north, the issue is whether they are able to take decisions without consulting representatives of the Serb population, which is not now represented in municipal political bodies. Kurti has made many similar gestures over the past couple of years, mostly as symbolic ways of performing the sovereignty of Kosovo over territory in the north. He is likely to continue doing this, since all of these demonstrations of sovereignty contribute to his popularity.

In general Serbs in Mitrovica have two problems with the prospect of reopening the bridge. The first problem is mostly symbolic: it has to do not with transportation but with the history of the bridge being a site for violent incidents. Because of that they tend to look at the bridge as the source of insecurity. The second problem relates to the way that Serbs living in the north have been treated in negotiations between Kosovo and Serbia. Like many other agreements, Belgrade’s decision to agree to the reopening of the bridge was made without the participation of representatives of ethnic Serbs living in the city. There is considerable resentment among Serbs living in the north about the ways in which the regime in Belgrade treats them as instruments without taking their interests and concerns into account.

For the time being Vučić is sharing the position of Serb residents of Mitrovica and characterising the initiative to reopen the bridge as a provocation. In doing this he is making use of Europe’s growing impatience with Kurti. The shows of force that Kurti has engineered create a particular problem for Kosovo’s largest international supporters, the United States and the United Kingdom. Their position as the international guarantors of Kosovo’s independence also obligates them to act as the guarantors of the rights and security of minority groups.

The bridge itself is relatively unimportant. Its reopening is a practical question that could be easily resolved if surrounding questions were not left open. But it will remain contentious as long as the fundamental question of how the two states in dispute with one another relate to the needs of ethnic Serb citizens of Kosovo remains unresolved. The issue demands that both Kurti and Vučić change their approach, and it also demands that the residents of the north be actively engaged, through their representatives, in negotiations. There is no way that this will happen without very intensive engagement on the part of the European Union, but we do not see any sign of that.

There was also a brief comment to Oslobođenje (Bosnia and Hercegovina) about Dodik cozying up to Orbán these days. They only used a couple of sentences in their article, which you can find (in Polycentric) here. This is the whole thing I told them.

Dodik's position has been weakened by the decline of Russian influence in the region. At one time he would be able to create publicity out of the support or silence of Russia, but the war in Ukraine has diminished Russia's capacity to project influence almost anywhere in the world outside of a few allies such as North Korea, some neighbouring states that have no choice but to give Russia permission to posture such as Mongolia, and a few opportunistic states that are profiting from Russia's weak position on energy markets such as India.

So Dodik needs new international sponsors but there are not many available. China's policymakers are far too cautious and sensible to risk long term relations with Europe by indulging Dodik's troublemaking. Milanović in Croatia has a sensibility and temperament that matches Dodik as well, but public opinion in Croatia is not very tolerant of that inclination. The Arabian gulf states have both economic and cultural reasons to avoid Dodik. This leaves states in Europe controlled by right wing parties, but Italy and Slovakia have no interest in putting their long term diplomatic loyalties aside for short term adventures. In Hungary Orbán enjoys taking on the role of “bad boy,” so he is available. 

The relationship with Hungary offers a weak political cover for Dodik, in the sense that he can show a relationship with a state that is a member of the EU, if not a well respected member under its current government. There are not many benefits for Hungary, but it is also true that the risks are low. 

With regard to the United States, all of the political actors in the region appear to be taking advantage of the fact that the horrors in Ukraine and Palestine are occupying the attention of the US and so there is little coherent American policy to speak of. For political actors from the chauvinist right there is probably also a hope that Trump may return to the US presidency and pursue a policy that is more suited to their goals. 

If I had to predict the future, from the standpoint of today it seems more probable that Trump will not be returned to office, but rather that Harris will be the next president. However, Biden's administration in which she is the vice president has not demonstrated much ambition or vision related to Southeast Europe. If she has a vision that goes beyond Biden's she has been very discreet about it. So the dismissive attitude of Dodik toward the US might be a consequence of the expectation that the US is not planning to be actively engaged in the region for some time, regardless of who is elected.

Finally, a longish interview with Monitor (Montenegro). There isn’t any English version, but it is here if you want to read it.